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The Chicago Fire of 1871:  
A Bottom-Up Approach to Disaster Relief 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Can bottom-up relief efforts lead to recovery after disasters? Conventional wisdom and 
contemporary public policy suggest that major crises require centralized authority to provide 
disaster relief goods. Using a novel set of comprehensive donation and expenditure data 
collected from archival records, this paper examines a bottom-up relief effort following one 
of the most devastating natural disasters of the nineteenth century: the Chicago Fire of 1871. 
Findings show that while there was no central government relief agency present, individuals, 
businesses, corporate entities and municipal governments were able to finance the relief 
effort though donations. The Chicago Relief and Aid Society, a voluntary association of 
agents with a stake in relief outcomes, leveraged organizational assets and constitutional rules 
to administer aid. 
JEL Codes: D64, D71, H41, H84 
Keywords: disaster relief, aid, charitable giving, natural disaster, Chicago Fire 1871 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The grief of Chicago is the sorrow of the country, and private citizens and 
public bodies are rivals in generosity. 
 
– Harper’s Weekly, October 21st, 1871 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Natural disasters are unpredictable and ruinous events that can destroy entire cities within 
hours. Large-scale catastrophes leave casualties, displaced families, commercial businesses 
and infrastructure in ruin, and the general population in immediate need of aid. Conventional 
wisdom and contemporary public policy suggest that major crises require centralized 
authority for providing disaster relief.1    
Increasingly, since the 1920s, the United States has centralized responses to natural 
disasters and these efforts often have been very costly (Leeson and Sobel 2008b). The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, nested within the larger federal bureaucracy of the 
Department of Homeland Security, has created perverse incentives that undermined 
successful collective action following major disasters, most notably after Hurricane Katrina. 
Politicians face weak incentives to prepare for emergencies and to mobilize resources 
promptly when disasters strike. The politics of bureaucracy in crisis require balancing special 
interests and competing political demands while spreading the costs of natural disasters over 
large populations (Shughart 2006).2 Nationally dispersed financing coupled with strong 
commitments to spend billions of federal tax dollars after disasters create moral hazard 
(Shughart 2006; Leeson and Sobel 2008a). Political incentives often mean that centralized 
government fails to prepare adequately for disasters (Congleton 2006) and to respond 
1 I use the terms “disaster relief” and “disaster aid” interchangeably to mean the immediate efforts to supply the 
victims with necessities and to re-establish the status quo prior to the disaster.  This paper focuses on these 
short-run relief efforts. When discussing implications for long-term recovery and reconstruction, I will use those 
terms accordingly.     
2 Balancing political demands and special interests after a crisis can work to the benefit of particular groups. 
After Hurricanes Frances and Katrina, Florida politicians reduced licensing restrictions on construction work 
they otherwise would enforce under non-crisis conditions (see Skarbek 2008). 
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promptly (Sobel and Leeson 2006). Nevertheless, the belief still persists that the federal 
government is the only institution with “the resources, authority and capabilities to help 
citizens cope with large scale cataclysmic events, like natural disasters” (Schneider  2008: 
715). Thaler and Sunstein (2008) epitomize these views when they argue,  “As the experience 
with Hurricane Katrina showed, government is often required to act, for it is the only means 
by which the necessary resources can be mustered, organized, and deployed (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008: 13). 
Both examples of government failure and economic theory suggest that federal 
disaster management may not be the best means for supplying relief (Skarbek 2010; Shughart 
2011). In a wide variety of circumstances, institutions organized from the bottom-up can be 
more effective than centralized systems at providing local public goods (Ostrom 1990). 
Experimental public good games show that individuals often make significant contributions 
to public goods voluntarily (Cox, Ostrom and Walker 2011), and people often choose private 
producers of disaster relief over their public counterparts at the federal, state, and local levels 
(Li et al. 2011).   
Field studies show that the organizational structure of aid delivery has a profound 
impact on the quality of disaster aid delivered. Following the Asian tsunami, Henderson and 
Lee (2011) find that domestic organizations and country-level governmental entities, which 
face both agency problems and lack proper incentives, offer low quality aid. In the case of 
tornado relief efforts, Smith and Sutter (2013) argue that rapid recovery was a result of 
federal, state, and local officials letting the voluntary sector lead the response and recovery 
effort. This research suggests that providing disaster relief from the bottom up delivers 
considerable benefits. Many examples exist of the private non-profit sector operating as an 
effective alternative to centralized provision of public goods (Cornuelle 1983; Cornuelle 
1993; Beito 2002; Beito, Gordon and Tabarrok 2002).   
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This article examines the process of bottom-up disaster relief following the Chicago 
Fire of 1871. This historical context affords the opportunity to examine the pattern of 
contributions to disaster relief and to understand how a bottom-up process might coordinate 
relief efforts. This particular case is useful for three reasons. First, in 1871 there was no 
formal political or bureaucratic organization for disaster relief at the federal or state level. 
Contemporary studies of bottom-up disaster relief provide rich, process-based accounts of 
community resilience but face the confounding factor of simultaneous federal involvement in 
relief efforts (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009; Chamlee-Wright2010). In fact, Chamlee-
Wright and Storr (2010) show that expectations of federal involvement in relief critically 
influences the bottom-up strategies adopted after disaster. At the time of the Chicago Fire, 
there was no federal funding administered for aid efforts, no procedural precedent to follow, 
and no bureau analogous to the Federal Emergency Management Agency to administer aid. 
This allows for a unique look at how a bottom-up process emerges within a context of local 
governments, voluntary associations, and market actors, thereby undermining arguments 
supporting the need for an overarching federal relief and recovery authority.   
Second, financing for the relief effort came exclusively from contributions rather than 
from national taxation or federal deficit finance. These data provide a comprehensive look at 
spontaneous contributions to a public good in a naturally occurring setting where potential 
contributors include private individuals, corporations, charitable institutions, and local 
municipal and state governments. In 1871, no federal income tax was collected, and, 
individual and corporate charitable giving therefore did not enjoy tax-favored status.3 As 
such, the period provides a natural experimental control, allowing the pattern of relief 
3 Although a wartime income tax was levied in 1861, the first peacetime federal income tax was not introduced 
until 1894.   
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funding to be free from incentive effects that are present in other periods because of 
governmental crowding out of private contributions to a public good.4   
Finally, relying on a historical case study is appropriate precisely because it allows for the 
examination of the institutional features of the rules governing disaster relief (Ostrom, 
Gardner and Walker 1994). Charitable giving under federalism has been empirically difficult 
to evaluate due to a lack of data at the local level (Steinberg 1987). Using novel quantitative 
and qualitative micro-level data, this paper utilizes a historical study of bottom-up disaster 
relief with a focus on how organizational rules affect aid delivery. Single case study analysis 
is particularly useful in this regard, allowing for an understanding of the structure of 
institutions that govern disaster (Ostrom 1990), the strategies agents employ (Chamlee-
Wright and Storr 2011), and identification of several key empirical implications (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994). By examining how a voluntary association utilized a particular 
configuration of rules for organizing relief efforts, this work advances an understanding of 
how bottom-up approaches to disaster relief can operate in the absence of centralized 
administration. The results of the study are presented in a historical analytical narrative that 
details the disaster response as it unfolded over time (Büthe 2002).   
The findings are twofold. First, decentralized contributions by businesses, individuals, 
social organizations, as well as municipal and foreign governments, financed the 
administration of disaster aid services. Private individuals, businesses, and corporate entities 
supplied 57% of the relief funds and made generous in-kind contributions to the relief and 
4 Cermak, File, and Prince (1994) find that tax incentives are the primary, egoistic motivators for donating to 
charity.  For the donor, the extent of tax deductibility has a major impact on the personal cost of making a 
contribution.  When the tax deductibility of donations changes, so does the cost of the contributing to charitable 
causes.  See Smith (1980) and Peloza and Steel (2005) for a meta-analysis of the incentive effects of changes in 
taxes on charitable contributions.  While agents respond to relative price changes, field experiments highlight 
the variance of agent responses to changes in institutions and mechanism design (see, for example, List and 
Lucking-Reiley 2002; Karlan and List 2007).  In addition, experimental studies by de Oliveira et al. (2011) find 
evidence for the existence of a “donor type” agent - suggesting that giving decisions are driven by a single factor 
and individuals who give to one organization, give significantly more to other organizations than do non-donors. 
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recovery effort. Donations came into Chicago immediately after the disaster and charitable 
giving tapered off as the need for aid diminished. Second, a local, private organization, the 
Chicago Relief and Aid Society, coordinated disaster aid efforts. The organization’s 
constitutional rules introduced effective criteria for rationing aid and limited the scope of its 
relief activities to key services where leadership, need, and local knowledge were aligned. 
These rules were easily adaptable to the unexpected and novel post-disaster context. The 
adaptable allocative rules enabled the organization to be flexible, to expand to meet the 
suddenly greater demands for aid, and to reduce its services once demand fell. Local 
knowledge and adaptable allocative rules enabled the group to cooperate with community 
residents to ration aid efficiently and effectively.   
2.   Bottom-up disaster relief   
How can a group of people who are in an interdependent post-disaster context organize and 
govern themselves to achieve a successful relief effort when members of the group may 
behave opportunistically? Once aid contributions have been made, they exhibit features of a 
common pool resource in that they are rivalrous, yet intended to be non-excludable to victims 
of disaster. Determining who is a victim entitled to aid and how much becomes precisely the 
Samaritan’s dilemma of providing relief (Buchanan 1972). Theories of state-led disaster 
relief explain how external agents attempt to supply new institutions, lower transactions 
costs, enforce commitments, and monitor the distribution of aid using an overarching state 
power as the organizational device. How a community of citizens can self-organize after a 
disaster to solve these same problems presents a puzzle. When disasters strike, some 
communities are successful at self-organizing relief while others are not. Given this variation, 
it is important to identify the factors that explain successful outcomes.  
A bottom-up system of disaster relief is one where individuals create and enforce the 
rules that govern disaster relief for their own community. The scale of the disaster dictates the 
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relevant communities affected and, consequently, the relevant jurisdiction. As such, bottom-
up and top-down organizational structures take on different characteristics when multiple 
layers of governance and authority are present in a particular context. “Top down” disaster 
relief occurs when one overarching authority administers the relief effort and smaller centers 
of authority derive their authority and permission to act from further up the chain of 
command. The directional nature of authority is the opposite in bottom-up relief efforts. The 
voluntary choices of individuals determine what types of functions accrue to centers of 
authority (Coyne and Lemke 2011) and the particular functions being carried out correspond 
to a “general consensus” among the governed (Wagner 2005).5 
Several key factors help explain when bottom-up relief efforts are likely to be 
effective at managing a pool of aid. These include the number of decision makers, the 
number of participants minimally necessary to achieve the collective benefit, participants’ 
discount rates, the degree of similarity among the interests and goals of decision makers, 
whether participants demonstrate leadership, and have (or can mobilize) assets relevant to 
achieving goals (Ostrom 1990: 188). These variables influence not only the internal 
effectiveness of governing resources, but also help to explain when these institutions will 
come into existence (Ostrom 1990). They help explain both the types of rules that will be 
effective at governing aid and when communities adopt such rules. Building on these 
concepts, I examine two hypotheses concerning the ability of a bottom up, private association 
to govern aid. 
The first hypothesis concerns the costs of securing agreement among those with 
decision-making power over the common pool of relief funds and their risk exposure to the 
outcome of disaster relief. As the number of people needed to reach agreement over 
5 A separate, but related literature concerns the role of public-private partnerships in disaster relief (see Abou-
bakr 2013).  
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competing uses of resources increases, the costs of deciding how those resources are used 
increases (Buchanan and Tullock 1965: 70). More homogeneity among the interests and the 
goals of decision makers also reduces decision-making costs (Ostrom 1990). Therefore, small 
homogeneous bodies of decisive decision makers are likely to achieve lower costs of 
allocating scarce resources. This is particularly important in the post-disaster context where 
the speed of relief services is often an integral component of success.   
In addition, large-scale disasters constitute high-impact events such that the 
magnitude of the event and the presence of informational opacity compound agency and 
moral hazard problems. Leadership roles in high-stakes, non-priced contexts take on greater 
significance than in priced contexts. Just as firms are like “islands of conscious power in this 
ocean of unconscious co-operation,” voluntary associations are structures for consciously 
directing resources that are non-priced internally.6 Unlike firms, however, voluntary 
associations often lack important external price and profit and loss signals to guide action. As 
such, the performance of voluntary associations is more sensitive to leader quality and 
exhibits greater volatility. Therefore, successful bottom-up disaster relief requires that people 
with control over general relief funds must have ‘skin in the game’ (Talib and Sandis 2014). 
That is, agents controlling aid must be exposed to some risk associated with the outcomes of 
their efforts by having a stake in those outcomes. 
Two features of agents with ‘skin in the game’ reflect Ostrom’s (1990) variables for 
successful bottom-up governance. First, decision makers with a stake in the outcome of relief 
efforts are more likely to have lower discount rates and longer time horizons. Such decision 
makers have an interest in establishing rules that govern the use of resources over time and 
institutions that survive into the future. Participants with longer time horizons will likely be 
6 Quoting D.H. Robertson, in a famous line, Ronald Coase (1937: 388) explains that firms are like, “Islands of 
conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of 
buttermilk.” 
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more discerning about how aid is spent, invest in institutions to govern this process, and have 
the patience to see longer-term objectives. Second, agents who have interests tied to the 
outcome of disaster relief are more likely to have some time- and place-specific knowledge of 
the community context of the disaster. Applying this to the disaster context provides the first 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Bottom-up disaster relief will be more effective the fewer the number 
of people required to make decisive decisions over the use of aid and when those 
people have a vested interest in the outcome. 
The second hypothesis focuses on the institutions that govern the aid delivery process. 
Aid delivery, by its very nature, introduces the possibility of opportunism, moral hazard, and 
free riding. Effective rules for mitigating these problems in the post-disaster context require 
that agents recognize the dilemma posed by aid (Buchanan 1972). Having done so, agents 
must then adopt rules that address problems of moral hazard and free riding. Finally, the rules 
that govern aid delivery must involve some mechanism to credibly commit agents to 
enforcing the rules (Schmidtchen 2002). Voluntary associations have residual claims to the 
activities generated by members’ compliance with the rules. Moreover, when organizations 
operate in a competitive environment and self-select individuals according to their 
governance needs, this increases the effectiveness of the constitutional constraints (Leeson 
2011). The second hypothesis therefore suggests: 
Hypothesis 2: Bottom-up disaster relief will be more effective when the rules that 
govern aid delivery recognize the strategic dilemma of giving aid and provide 
procedural guidance for limiting moral hazard and free rider problems inherent in 
these post-disaster contexts.   
With these two key hypotheses in mind, we can analyse the case of the Chicago Fire of 1871.  
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3.   The Chicago fire: history and data   
In the ten years leading up to 1871, Chicago’s population had tripled (Andreas 1884: 52). The 
city was a growing center of manufacturing, industry, and trade. Businessmen had come from 
the Northeast for enterprise opportunities in a city that was well-positioned within a system of 
national waterways and rail networks. Private assets valued at over $200 million dollars at the 
time of the fire turned to ashes overnight (Andreas 1884a). The fire reduced the city 
courthouse, municipal buildings, hotels, depots, grain mills, lumberyards, churches, theaters, 
newspaper offices, and residences to rubble. 
The fire began burning in the West Division of the city around 10pm on October 8th, 
1871. The flames moved quickly into to the North of the city and burned for 29 hours, killing 
over 300 people, and leaving more than one-third of the city’s 300,000 inhabitants homeless. 
News of the fire began to spread across the country on the 9th and efforts to aid victims were 
underway by the morning of the 10th. On October 11, 1871, the smouldering remains of a city 
stood in place of what just days before had been the booming urban epicentre of Chicago.7 
Sweeping through the city, the flames consumed approximately 17,420 buildings and 
more than 73 miles of street frontage (Andreas 1884a: 52; Sawislak 1995: 2). With only one 
and a half inches of rain in the three months before the fire, the dry wooden structures 
throughout Chicago burned quickly. Intense heat created convection effects that carried 
burning pieces of buildings, roofing, sparks and flames – “starting new fires in advance of the 
main fire and hampering any systematic attempt to fight the blaze” (Pauly 1984: 669). As it 
grew, the fire completely consumed the central business district in the South Division, 
destroying the most expensive property in Chicago. In terms of the number of people 
7 As the Chicago Tribune reported the same day, “A fire in a barn on the West Side was the insignificant cause 
of a conflagration which has swept out of existence hundreds of millions of property, has reduced to poverty 
thousands who, the day before, were in a state of opulence, has covered the prairies with thousands of homeless 
unfortunates, which has stripped 3,600 acres of buildings, which has destroyed public improvements that is has 
taken years of patient labor to build up, and which has set back for years the progress of the city, diminished her 
population, and crushed her resources”  (ProQuest Historical Newspapers 1849-1986): 1). 
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affected, the fire did the worst damage in the city’s North District. A mixture of expensive 
lakeside homes, cottages, small shops, churches and schools accounted for the North Side’s 
13,800 pre-fire buildings. Only 500 remained intact after the fire and most of the city’s 
homeless people came from the North District.  
In the wake of widespread ruin, volunteers gathered at Standard Hall on the corner of 
Thirteenth and Michigan Avenue, one of the few remaining buildings in the city.  The 
purpose of the gathering was, according to the 1871 Records of the Proceedings of the 
General Relief Commission, “threefold: to perfect arrangements to distribute food to the 
suffering, to organize a citizens patrol for duty, and to secure the immediate restoration of the 
business portion of the city” (Andreas 1884a; Pierce 1933). As monetary donations and gifts 
in kind flowed into Chicago, Mayor R. B. Mason issued a proclamation “… deem[ing] it best 
for the interest of this city to turn over to the Chicago Relief and Aid Society [CRAS] all 
contributions for suffering people in this city” (reprinted in CRAS 1874: 121). The Chicago 
Relief and Aid Society, a voluntary charitable organization of local elite citizens became the 
primary provider of public disaster aid services to Chicago and the recipient of all donations 
sent to the city for the public aid effort.    
Before the fire, the Chicago Relief and Aid Society was one of many voluntary 
associations, fraternal societies, and charitable institutions operating in Chicago.8 These 
societies were exceptionally diverse in the purposes they served and the composition of their 
memberships. Selectivity was common among both mutual aid societies and charitable 
institutions of the period, as was distinguishing between the deserving and undeserving poor 
8 Fraternal societies such as the Knights of Pythias, Ancient Order of Good Fellows, the Independent Order of 
Sons of Malta, and B’nai B’rith supplied mutual aid to their members. The latter organization, for example, had 
584 members living in Chicago when the fire destroyed the city, and they could draw on a national network 
exceeding 25,000 members, 2,500 of whom lived in the tri-state area (Andreas 1884a). Some associations were 
selective based on ethnicity, such the Society for the Protection and Aid of German Immigrants, and most 
mutual aid societies were composed generally of members of the working class population (Andreas 1884b).   
By 1871, apart from the Chicago Relief and Aid Society, the two other important social agencies were the 
Chicago Orphan Asylum and the Home for the Friendless.  See Brown (1941: viii). 
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(Beito 2002). Notably, however, while most fraternal societies discriminated along racial or 
ethnic lines, the Society’s efforts were distinctive in two respects. First, the Society’s efforts 
were directed toward aiding members of the general public, not providing mutual aid only to 
those with paid memberships. Second, the Society’s constitution and bylaws did not restrict 
membership based on race or class distinctions.9    
The Chicago Relief and Aid Society sought to provide temporary aid to the 
“industrious and deserving poor” who, “overtaken by sickness, accident, the loss of 
employment, or the destruction of property, fall behind” (CRAS 1874: 122). At the time, 
Cook County’s poor relief activities consisted mainly of operating an almshouse and an 
insane asylum. The county agent’s “outdoor relief” offered small subsidies to the very poor 
under a system that often was unsystematic and irregular (Brown 1941). After the county 
discontinued “outdoor” relief in 1848 and again 1851, the Society was founded with the 
purpose “to afford temporary relief to the destitute” and “rendering timely counsel and 
assistance to deserving but indigent persons…without limiting itself to any one class in the 
distribution of its charities” (CRAS 1874: 126). Established in 1850, the members believed 
that in a “domestic emergency, charity, judiciously and opportunely administered, will in 
many instances rescue them from permanent pauperism and save the family from being 
broken up” (CRAS 1874: 122).   
On the afternoon of October 10th, notices were posted around the burnt areas 
announcing that all public buildings were open for shelter to those in need. The members of 
the General Relief Committee, a government body that included the Mayor of Chicago, an 
alderman, and private citizens representing each of the city’s main divisions, signed the 
9There is no evidence to suggest that the Chicago Relief and Aid Society ever had black members; however, no 
provisions banned black, Indian, or any other race outright. This is exceptional given that, as Beito (2002) 
reports, most fraternal organizations did not permit non-Caucasian members. For example, of the 386 
organizations in Connecticut in 1891, 97.6% barred blacks from membership (Beito 2002: 45).   
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declaration (General Relief Committee Poster 1871). However, the governing of municipal 
relief by the alderman and representatives was short lived. On October 13th, Mayor Mason 
handed over relief efforts to the Chicago Relief and Aid Society, making it the primary 
provider of relief services to Chicago and the receiver of all aid donations sent to the city.   
The jurisdictional landscape of the United States in the late 19th century was 
characterized by four tiered levels of government: federal, state, county, and city/municipal. 
The locus of fiscal exchanges that funded the general relief effort after the fire were between 
private individuals, businesses, and dispersed municipal governments. Public bodies and 
private organizations were rivals in generosity. Decisions to contribute came from 
independent centers of power, each with the ability to operate in accordance with their 
established rules and scopes of authority.  In other words, aid financing was horizontal in 
nature, neither extending upwards nor downwards along an organizational hierarchy. 
On the expenditure side, exchanges occurred between the Mayor of Chicago, the 
Chicago Relief and Aid Society, community groups and charitable associations, and Chicago 
residents. Given the federal organizational structure of nested, general-purpose jurisdictions 
of the United States, this was a comparatively decentralized means of administering disaster 
relief. A much more “top down” approach was possible. The federal government could have 
intervened to supply disaster relief through federal financing and/or military action. Similar 
functions and authority could have been exercised at the Illinois state level. In both of these 
cases, the directional nature of authority would have been from the top down to the 
community level. Alternatively, authority could have been delegated upwards from the local 
level of the mayor’s office, as was the case with security when the mayor called in federal 
troops and declared martial law – an unpopular decision that ultimately was rescinded 
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(Sawislak 1995: 59).10 With disaster aid, the situation was different. Authority over the 
general relief effort came from a group of citizens with a history of providing such services to 
in the community. 
When the financing and expenditures after the Chicago Fire are viewed in concert, 
disaster relief was more horizontal and polycentric than vertical and monocentric in structure. 
Competition and contract governed relationships among local public authorities and private 
associations rather than command and control from the top down (Ostrom 2010). As such, the 
process of disaster relief was one where the individuals holding power were constrained to 
act in accordance with a previously adopted set of rules designed to meet the interests of the 
individuals they govern.11  
To understand the performance of this bottom-up relief effort, I rely on evidence 
collected from primary source materials and historical accounts. First, data on every donation 
made to the general relief fund after the Chicago Fire were collected from the Chicago Relief 
and Aid Society’s extensive annual reports, now located in the Library of Congress. These 
reports detail all of the donations sent to fund public aid efforts in the aftermath of the 
disaster and how the society dispersed the funds. Public records and official documents 
confirm the reported aggregate level of donations (Chicago Public Records 1881; Andreas 
1884b; Sawislak 1995), but no one has yet examined the data at the micro level to understand 
10 General Sheridan had troops present in Chicago from October 11th through the 23th. Before the arrival of 
Sheridan’s 600 troops, public safety and policing were provided by 1,479 police officers, volunteers, and reserve 
troops from neighboring militias and 450 “merchant police” – private guards and watchmen employed by 
railroads, hotels, and banks. Police commissioners Thomas Brown and Mark Sheridan argued that the mayor 
should leave public safety to those “thoroughly acquainted with the character of the people” (Thomas Brown 
testimony quoted in Sawislak 1995: 55). The mayor however, chose to delegated authority to General Sheridan, 
while ordering him to refrain from “interfering with the functions of city government” (Colbert and Chamberlin 
1871: 498).  Sheridan then exercised martial law, extended his powers arbitrarily to enforce price controls, and 
issued a strict curfew to take effect at sundown. Sheridan ordered his men to fire on any person who disobeyed 
an order (Sawislak 1995: 57). Martial law quickly unraveled after Sheridan’s troops killed a local prosecuting 
attorney, Thomas Grosvenor, who walking home after dark on October 20th, 1871 (Sawislak 1995: 59).  
11 Self-governance systems are those where the individuals holding power are constrained to act in accordance 
with the rules adopted by and preferences of the individuals they govern (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961). 
See (Lemke 2012) for a similar description of the jurisdictional landscape of nineteenth century America as 
polycentric.   
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donor types and the structure of contributions. The Chicago Relief and Aid Society’s reports 
include the names of donors, the amounts of their contribution, the dates on which the 
Society received the contribution, and the donor’s geographic location. I code these data for 
descriptive characteristics of the donors as individuals, businesses, municipal government 
collections from citizens’ voluntary contributions, municipal government pledges of tax 
receipts on the behalf of mayors, clubs, churches, and private associations.   
Second, the Chicago Relief and Aid Society filed accounting records and reports, 
allowing for a comprehensive account of how the organization allocated relief funds. These 
records include the amount given to particular organizations, firms, and individuals and often 
specified the intended use of the aid. I collect these records and code them to examine the 
pattern by which relief disbursements were made and the types of spending projects 
undertaken. In addition, I draw on records, diaries, newspapers, and historical accounts to 
provide a rich picture of how relief operations functioned. Because the fire destroyed nearly 
all of Chicago’s public records, notable limitations exist in the data before 1871.12 
4.  Aid contributions 
As the flames of the fire were still burning on October 9th, news of the Great Fire spread 
across the country. The mayor’s office immediately began receiving telegraphs expressing 
sympathies, pledging relief funds, and offering to supply goods and services. Municipal 
governments across the country held meetings, many in immediate response to the news of 
the fire. A telegram from the mayor of Philadelphia, for example, says that “…the city of 
Philadelphia instantly responds by authorizing one hundred thousand dollars, raised in one 
hour at a meeting of the citizens held at the mayor’s office” (CRAS 1874: 27). In Manchester, 
12 According to Brown (1941: ix), “an inventory of the country archives of Illinois made in 1915 listed a few 
volumes of Cook County records which survived the fire, but these have now disappeared from the county 
commissioner’s vaults”.  
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New Hampshire the “citizens in a mass meeting this evening …unanimously approved the 
sum of fifteen thousand dollars” (CRAS 1874: 27).   
In addition to local governments, meetings of all kinds of voluntary associations 
occurred in the immediate aftermath of disaster and enabled the groups quickly to gather 
funds for relief. For instance, “At a special meeting of Walworth Hose Association of 
Saratoga Springs, held Tuesday evening October 10th, 1871, it was unanimously resolved to 
appropriate…aid for the sufferers of Chicago” (CRAS 1874: 50).13  That same day, “At a 
meeting of Apollo Lodge, No. 13…held last evening, it was unanimously resolved that the 
sum of one hundred dollars ($100) be donated to the relief of the Chicago sufferers” (CRAS 
1874: 50). Most voluntary groups secured the consent of their members for contributions. 
Theater groups pledged the proceeds of their shows to the Society, women’s groups took up 
collections, and labor unions solicited member contributions.   
Businesses quickly summoned their board members to agree on contributions. The 
president of the Board of Trade and Corn Exchange in Montreal telegrammed on the 10th 
indicating that their members “have made a beginning by subscribing ten thousand dollars.” 
(CRAS 1874: 31). The next day, telegrams such as those from the treasurer of the New York 
Produce Exchange came coupled with checks, “I have this day forwarded to you for the 
sufferers of your city, by American Merchants’ Union Express, fifteen thousand dollars 
($15,000) as a part of the subscription by members of the New York Produce Exchange.  Will 
forward again as soon as I can make collections. I now have thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) 
subscribed” (CRAS 1874: 50).   
13 As mentioned previously, many of the donations were raised in conjunction with mutual aid payments for the 
members of networked organizations. For example, on October 11th, the San Francisco Chronicle published 
letters received the previous day from the Fraternal Order of the Odd Fellows of Chicago.  Alongside the 
correspondence were statements describing their fundraising efforts, such as “Lodge 124 took the initiative step 
at its meeting last night, and appropriated five hundred dollars to their relief fund for the Chicago Odd Fellows” 
(San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 11, 1871: 3). These records are consistent with Mancur Olson’s (1965) 
byproduct theory of collective action, whereby groups organized for some other purpose (mutual aid, here) can 
be redirected to supply other public goods at relatively low cost.   
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[ Table 1] 
Table 1 summarizes donation amounts over time following the October 1871 fire. The 
data include 1,555 unique contributions, originating from 794 distinct jurisdictions, totalling 
$3.78 million in domestic contributions and $1.02 million from foreign sources. All data are 
in nominal dollars. Most foreign donations arrived within the first month after the fire. 
Ninety-eight percent of total donations were made within the first year of the fire, tapering off 
over the next six months.   
[Figure 1] 
 
Figure 1 supplies a closer look at the public and private domestic donations received 
by the Relief and Aid Society in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. The Chicago Relief 
and Aid Society’s records began on the date they officially took charge of the aid efforts, 
October 14th. The organization did not record donations on Sundays. Domestic donations 
given in the first 20 days following the fire totalled $1.4 million. Foreign donations arriving 
within the same period amounted to $1.02 million. Fifty percent of total donations arrived in 
the first two weeks following the disaster and 68% of total domestic donations arrived before 
the end of the year. Coupling business contributions with those made by individuals and 
voluntary associations, US individuals and businesses donated $2.16 million – accounting for 
57% of total domestic aid. Of the $4.8 million in total donations made to finance public relief 
efforts, $3.7 million originated domestically – from municipal governments, businesses, 
individuals, and voluntary organizations. Table 2 summarizes the types of donors 
contributing to the Chicago general relief effort from 1871 to 1873 and the totals of their 
respective contributions.   
[Table 2]  
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Perhaps the most significant feature of this bottom-up approach to financing relief is 
the responsiveness of funding to the demand for aid. As the relief efforts were underway, 
donations began to decline (See Figure 2 above). As early as February 1, 1872, the president 
and chairman of the executive committee of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society issued a 
statement to the press indicating that the organization had enough resources in hand to carry 
out the relief efforts and, in effect, stating that additional funds would not be needed.14  After 
the summer of 1872, revenues into the general relief funds dropped off substantially. The 
Society closed the Special Relief Period in May of 1874, with a remaining balance of 
$581,328 on its books (CRAS 1874: 440). Historian James Brown (1941: iv) concludes that,  
the total amount contributed was more than ample to meet the actual disaster needs, the 
surplus being used to strengthen existing social agencies.  The financial stimulus and 
prestige resulting from the handling of this large job left the Chicago Relief and Aid 
Society as the dominant force in the field and for the next few years the county’s rôle 
was a minor one.  
After the Special Relief Period ended, the Chicago Relief and Aid Society gradually 
returned to operating in a manner consistent with its charter and pre-fire charitable 
operations.15    
5.  The relief effort 
The initial conditions of the Chicago Fire were chaotic. Nonetheless, members of the city 
council, board of trade, Chicago Relief and Aid Society, medical doctors, and prominent 
citizens met in the Congressional Church on the afternoon of the 9th and formed a General 
Relief Committee. The next day elected officers met to organize relief efforts in relation to 
14 “The continued donations since our last report, together with the twenty days of mild weather in January, 
enable us to say that the resources of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society will meet the wants of the present 
winter. By resources we mean not only what we have actually received, but various sums of which we have 
been advised….We regard it as a duty to make this announcement the earliest day that it could be made with 
reasonable assurance of its correctness. We can also say that there will be enough to make temporary provision 
for our charitable institutions whose resources were cut off by the fire” (CRAS 1874: 140; Chicago Tribune 
1872). 
15 The panic of 1873 led to demands from unemployed workers for the Society to distribute the remaining 
balance for work relief. The Society responded by extending their operations to aid 9,710 families, some of who 
were listed in the records as fire victims (see Brown 1941: 119). 
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the most obvious and pressing needs (Records of the Proceedings of the General Relief 
Commission 1871; CRAS 1874: 118).    
As the fire was still smouldering, officers of major rail companies made their lines 
available for use in the aid efforts. The president of the Erie Rail Road wrote to Chicago on 
October 9th informing city officials of the availability of a fleet of rail cars at their New York 
depot ready to “receive and forward, free of charge, on fast train…all contributions which the 
citizens of New York may contribute in aid of the sufferers” (CRAS 1874: 27). 
Schoolhouses, churches, and all available public buildings were opened immediately to the 
public as temporary housing for all who had nowhere else to go. 
By Thursday, October 12th, the General Relief Committee reported, “every person 
rendered homeless by the fire was placed under shelter and supplied with food last night” 
(General Relief Committee; reported in CRAS 1874: 119). It is not plausible the alderman 
issuing the statement actually knew whether everyone was housed and it was likely not the 
direct result of coordinated effort on the part of the General Relief Committee or the Society. 
Private residents of Chicago with homes still standing took in people needing emergency 
shelter and various public buildings and structures outside the city were made available for  
housing the homeless. Joseph and Elizabeth Hudlin, for example, were an African American 
couple whose home escaped the fire. They provided refuge to both white and black neighbors 
needing housing, opening their five-room cottage to house five families after the fire (Reed 
2005: 188).   
On October 12th, the Mayor of Chicago declared that “the Chicago Relief and Aid 
Society be adopted as the means of distributing the food and supplies received for the 
suffering” (CRAS 1874: 119). Officials issued a public proclamation the next day, citing the 
Chicago Relief and Aid Society as “an incorporated and old established organization, having 
19 
 
possessed for many years the entire confidence of our community, and is familiar with the 
work to be done” (Chicago Tribune October 12th, 1871; CRAS 1871: 15-23, 1874: 116-121). 
On October 17th, the Chairman and Secretary of the General Relief Commission wrote to the 
Chairman of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society, indicating that it had “discontinued any 
official action and have since referred all official matters” to the Chicago Relief and Aid 
Society (CRAS 1874: 120). 
The decision on the part of Mayor Mason to entrust the general relief contributions to 
the Chicago Relief and Aid Society was self-serving. The Mayor of Chicago is elected by 
popular vote and was responsible for appointing the Fire Commissioner. He faced a choice 
after the fire between backing the General Relief Committee, comprised of local alderman, or 
the Chicago Relief and Aid Society, comprised of local businessmen. Having already made a 
widely unpopular decision to impose martial law and then withdrawing that order, the mayor 
was in no position to risk losing further political support. On top of the poor quality of the 
public relief institutions, two major scandals involving public mismanagement of funds, graft, 
and patronage surfaced the year before the fire (Sawislak 1995: 83). The local aldermen 
themselves were facing upcoming municipal elections, and giving the funds to them would 
provide little benefit to the mayor. By giving the money to the Chicago Relief and Aid 
Society, he garnered support from business elites before his upcoming re-election campaign 
and utilized a group that could be scapegoated as not publicly accountable after the fact, 
should the relief effort turn out to be unsuccessful.   
During the first few days following the fire, few means were available for rationing 
aid in the form of the in-kind donations coming into the city. Abundant supplies were arriving 
by train, with “first come, first served” as the primary means of distributing goods to those in 
immediate need. The Society soon organized relief efforts by establishing committees for 
transportation, housing, food and clothing distribution, employment, charitable organizations, 
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and medical aid and appointing chairs to oversee operations. A member of the Society who 
had extensive knowledge of the type of work he was assigned to supervise headed each of the 
committees (CRAS 1871, 1873; Andreas 1884b). Committee leadership by key people in the 
relevant industries allowed the Society to leverage industry-specific networks, supply chains, 
and pre-existing local knowledge of the relevant industries.  
George Pullman and Charles G. Hammond, prominent figures in the railroad and 
shipping industries, directed the transportation committee by working with the railroad 
companies to make accommodations for thousands of people seeking to evacuate the city 
(CRAS 1873; Andreas 1884b). In the immediate aftermath of disaster, railroad companies 
allowed thousands of victims to travel on the rails free of charge (Andreas 1881b; CRAS 
1874: 180). Once the relief effort was underway, the Society rationed railroad passes and 
later paid passenger fares. From October 13th to October 31th, the Society issued rail passes 
allowing more than 7,000 persons to evacuate, thus permitting families not willing or able to 
remain in the city to relocate to the homes of friends and relatives elsewhere (CRAS 1874: 
182).16   
Between October 1871 and May 1, 1873 the Society aided in the evacuation of 39,242 
families (156,968 persons), supplying an average of $96.50 in aid. Figure 2 shows that from 
1867 to 1870, the Chicago Relief and Aid Society aided between 1,363 and 1,560 families 
per year, dispersing $23 to $27 dollars in aid per family, on average (CRAS 1874; Nelson 
1966: 55). Unsolicited contributions collected from 1871 to 1872 yielded a 320% increase in 
aid provided to needy families, 27 times as many as had been helped before the fire.   
[Figure 2] 
16 Estimates published in Andreas (1884b) suggest that about 15,000–20,000 people evacuated Chicago in the 
first few days after the fire.  
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The Society aided thousands more through donations of clothing, food, and household 
necessities. In-kind aid to a family of five consisted of a substantial weekly ration of fresh 
and dried meats, flour, potatoes, fruit, tea, sugar, rice, and soap.17 Added to this was a 
monthly coal ration capable of heating a home adequately. Over the year and a half, the 
Society distributed nearly 1.2 million pounds of flour during the relief effort and twice as 
much beef (CRAS 1874; Andreas 1884b). 
Most of the victims of the fire lost all of their personal apparel and household goods. 
In the first week, more than 330 rail cars brought donations of clothing, goods, and supplies 
into Chicago from all over the northeast, shipped free of charge by the rail companies. 
Donations of garments that came into the city most often were second-hand summer clothing 
– insufficient for the approaching winter months. The Society worked closely with volunteers 
and employees from local women’s associations to create depots in key locations in each of 
Chicago’s neighborhoods. Women stitched together donated clothing such that it would be 
suitable for the winter – bed comforters, linens, and other articles from the items donated to 
the Society. During the relief effort, the Society distributed in excess of 450,000 pieces of 
suitable clothing for men, women, children, and at least 77,000 pairs of shoes. 
The Society approved 9,962 of the 16,299 applications received before May 1, 1873 
for specific allocations of capital, tools, and machinery. They gave priority for allocating aid 
to women and children, many of whom made a living prior to the fire as seamstresses, 
supplying them with as many as 5,299 sewing machines (CRAS 1874). The Special Relief 
Committee granted funds to assist applicants in re-establishing a previous business and gave 
tradesmen tools and instruments to enable them to take up work they had done before the fire. 
17 Three pounds of pork, six pounds of beef, 14 pounds of flour, 1¼ peck of potatoes, ¼ pound of tea, 1½ 
pounds of sugar, 1¼ pounds of rice, 1¼ pounds of soap, 1½ pounds of dried apples, and three pounds of fresh 
beef (CRAS 1874: 160). 
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During the relief period, the Society spent a total of $437,458 aiding residents of Chicago 
with capital allocations to rebuild their small businesses.     
One of the most significant aspects of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society’s efforts 
was housing the homeless. The first order of business was to erect barracks, each family 
having two rooms furnished with cooking utensils, other necessities, and bedding. Just more 
than a week after the fire, the Society began a large-scale housing effort to construct new 
single-family residences for those who had lost their homes. The Society made arrangements 
and secured the resources for two types of basic homes, one for families of three persons and 
one for families of more than three persons, who either owned or rented their homes prior to 
the fire. The majority of applicants were working-class families who received the raw 
materials from the Chicago Relief and Aid Society and constructed the homes themselves. 
Committee volunteers built homes for widows, the elderly, or the infirm. Each house came 
equipped with a stove, crockery, utensils, a table, chairs, a bed frame, and bedding. Within a 
month, the committees used 25 million board feet of lumber to build 5,226 of these single-
family homes, providing housing for 25,000 to 30,000 people. By 1873, the RAS had 
supplied the resources for the production of an estimated 8,000 cottages (CRAS 1873: 185-
88, 192-194, 272-280; Chicago Tribune, October 9, 1982).   
Fire damage was concentrated geographically in the Northern division of the city.  
That area was home to German, Scandinavian, and Irish immigrant populations, while native-
born satirists termed it “the Nord Seite” (Sawislak 1995: 76). Local journalists concluded that 
“our German fellow citizens suffered the worst” and the first after-fire issue of the Straats-
Zeitung – a German paper with national distribution - detailed the plights of particular 
German shopkeepers from the North Side (Sawislak 1995: 76).   
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Like many rapidly growing urban areas of the time, tensions existed between 
immigrant and native-born populations. In Chicago, some historians believe that “the native 
born...exploited the immigrant Irish, Scandinavians, and Germans, with the hope of building 
vast, or at least moderate, fortunes” (Nelson 1966: 54). In the case of the distribution of aid, 
however, relief records and historical accounts indicate that aid did, in fact, reach those 
populations most in need. Of the 18,478 families who received aid by mid-December, only 
1,965 were of native birth, and “eighty-nine percent of the applicants to official relief agents 
were thus part of the immigrant population” (Sawislak 1995: 79).   
Table 3 shows the distribution of total aid by population in relation to the pre-fire 
demographics. The native born made up just over half of the pre-fire population, but the 
immigrant populations most prevalent in the North Division received the most aid. German 
immigrants were the largest ethnic concentration, 18% of the pre-fire urban population, yet 
they received 38% of the total aid distributed. Similarly, Irish populations comprised 12% of 
the pre-fire population and received 30% of aid. The African American population was 
concentrated primarily in the Southeast of the city, which experienced some damage from the 
flames. According to historian Chirstopher Reed (2005: 187), “The African American 
community suffered, but in regard to physical damage, it suffered disproportionately less than 
the rest of the city.”18 Nonetheless, the African American 1% of the city population before 
the fire received 2% of the aid administered by the Chicago Relief and Aid Society. 
Moreover, in 1875, the city council investigated a complaint concerning the Society’s 
methods of administering relief. The committee “found no evidence of partiality or prejudice 
on account of nationality of religion” and concluded, “the whole business had been faithfully 
18 Evidence from historian Christopher Reed, a specialist in African American experience in twentieth century 
Chicago, seems to confirm the fact that the Chicago Relief and Aid Society did not discriminate against blacks 
when making aid distributions.  On July 14th, 1874, another fire broke out in Chicago, this time destroying many 
houses in the African American community. Reed (2005: 190) reports that, “With alacrity, assistance was 
forthcoming, with the Chicago Relief and Aid Society providing cash and other help.” 
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and wisely administered” (CRAS 1875: 6; also Brown 1941: 119). The most vulnerable 
populations, compared to the native-born residents, received more aid.  
[ Table 3] 
The Society extended the reach of its operations by coordinating efforts and 
producing relief services with a variety of local voluntary associations. A letter from the 
Good Samaritans association published by the Chicago Tribune in March of 1872 
acknowledges the contributions of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society as among the most 
significant donations that allowed the organization to aid 4,975 individuals. The public 
announcement included statements indicating that, “applications for aid have been received 
from all classes of people. Special attention has been given to those persons who have not 
applied elsewhere; to those who have applied elsewhere and whose need have been 
overlooked or disregarded” (Chicago Tribune March 11, 1872).   
By redistributing supplies and resources to other aid organizations, the Society 
utilized groups with specific knowledge of needs within the community. Initial lump-sum 
appropriations of $329,900 were distributed to local hospitals, orphanages, and groups caring 
for the sick, homeless, and elderly (CRAS 1872: 14-15). The Society continued to make 
lump-sum appropriations for these organizations and, by 1876, had dispersed $617,810 in aid 
(CRAS Eighteenth Annual Report 1875: 18-19; Brown 1941: 115). In almost every case, the 
organization receiving the aid contracted with the Society to guarantee it the right to provide 
a specified number of beds.    
The Society facilitated medical treatment by financing home visits, local hospitals, 
and dispensaries. It began by appointing a medical superintendant to each sub-district of the 
city. Each superintendent established an office wherever possible in the sub-district assigned, 
served as a coordination point for volunteer and paid physicians, and was responsible for 
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keeping medicine on hand to administer to the health needs of the local community (CRAS 
1871: 23). In addition, the Society established six medical dispensaries within the first 
months after the fire: one in the North Division, three in the West Division, and two in the 
South (CRAS 1871: 24).  
Physicians made house visits and reported their work to the superintendent who kept 
records. From October 17, 1871 to May 1, 1873, the Society treated 89,724 patients, filling 
76,660 prescriptions and administering treatments for ailments such as bronchitis, cholera, 
diarrhea, rheumatism, and fever (CRAS 1874; Andreas 1884b). In addition, the six medical 
dispensaries provided 63,933 free smallpox vaccinations as a public health initiative to 
prevent an outbreak (CRAS 1874; Andreas 1884b).   
The Chicago Relief and Aid Society was capable of coordinating an expansive relief 
effort. The voluntary association effectively clothed and housed the city’s homeless, supplied 
rations to struggling families, facilitated mobility in and out of the city for goods, services, 
and families needing to relocate, provided free vaccinations for 20% of the population, and 
worked with local charities and employers to find work for the unemployed. By the winter of 
1873, 86.5% fewer families were receiving relief from the Society, having found employment 
and the wherewithal to support their families (Figure 2 above; Andreas 1884b).   
6. The institutional rules governing bottom-up disaster relief 
The aid operations of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society involved an “enormous and 
unprecedented organizational effort” of coordinating private inputs into the production of 
disaster relief (Sawislak 1995: 82). Managing the distribution of goods was complex, 
requiring experience with context-specific production and distribution chains. The Society 
noted the exceptional nature of their endeavour, explaining that, “the distribution of millions 
of dollars among seventy five thousand persons...is a problem upon which experience throws 
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little light” (CRAS Special Report: 30). Yet, despite the complexity of the environment, 
historian Karen Sawislak (1995: 91-92) reports that the Chicago Relief and Aid Society 
“transformed itself into a social welfare giant” in the space of a few days and the 
“commercial magnates who ran the Society excelled at meeting precisely this type of 
challenge.” One month after the fire, an article in the Overland Monthly stated that the 
ongoing relief effort in Chicago was “as thoroughly systematized as the business of any 
commercial house of the city” (Sawislak 1995: 92).   
 The successful relief effort following the Chicago Fire, I argue, is consistent with both 
of the two general hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of bottom-up disaster relief. First, 
the leadership of the Society had a history in the community, established experience with 
specific industries relevant to supplying relief, and a clear stake in Chicago’s commercial 
future. Second, the Society’s organizational constitution (see Appendix 1) outlined the 
principles for governing aid and guided the rationing of contributions according to general 
criteria. The Society then utilized broad cross-sections of the local population for distributing 
aid and monitoring aid disbursements for fraudulent claims. These rules were congruent and 
applicable to governing the allocation of aid and the particular tasks relating to the post-fire 
conditions. I consider each of these claims in turn.   
6.1 Hypothesis 1: relief leaders as stakeholders 
Managing relief efforts successfully requires solving the problems of leadership and internal 
governance. At the time of the fire, Cook County’s administration of poor relief consisted of 
operating an almshouse, an insane asylum, and making disbursements of outdoor relief. 
There was one warden for the almshouse and the insane asylum and the operating budgets of 
both were lumped together into one financial statement. During the relief period, the annual 
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amount spent by these intuitions was just under $70,000.19  A board of county commissioners 
elected all county officers. According to Brown (1941: 84), “the selection of persons to fill 
these positions was made not on the basis of qualification, but rather as a reward for political 
services rendered.” Minor employees of these institutions were appointed directly by the 
board, which meant that the head of these institutions did not have authority to hire and fire 
his subordinates, “with the natural result that there was little discipline” (ibid.: 85). In 
examining these public institutions, historian James Brown (ibid.: 127) documents the 
“inefficient methods of administration” that were “poorly adapted” to administering relief. He 
(ibid.: 126) concludes that, “there can be no questioning of the fact that public ‘outdoor’ 
relief was poorly and sometimes dishonestly administered.”   
In terms of practical experience, the Society was suited to the task of providing 
widespread relief “in ways the city government decidedly was not” (Sawislak 1995: 82). The 
population of Chicago shared a recent history and common identity as Chicago residents, 
even though half of the population were immigrants of different backgrounds and despite 
socioeconomic disparities.20 Media reports and narratives of the fire spoke of a common bond 
uniting Chicagoans in the wake of the terrible ruin. As for the members of the Society, each 
had made fortunes in Chicago, suffered business losses as a result of the fire, and all could 
reasonably have expected to share in the future prosperity of the city. The men who 
composed the Society’s executive committee were men for whom reputations were important 
amongst one another as well as with the public of Chicago. They had long time horizons and 
large stakes in the city’s recovery. If costly investments were necessary to ensure an urban 
19 The annual figures for the almshouse and the insane asylum are from 1871. The amount spent on outdoor 
relief in 1873 was $170,000, but there are no data available for 1871. See Brown (1941: 81, 120).  
20 For example, historian Christopher Reed (2005: 189) reports that African Americans in Chicago 
“demonstrated a high sense of civic awareness and commitment during the fire. Their efforts persisted in the 
aftermath of the conflagration and their concern for their fellow citizens and public and private property moved 
their recognized level of citizenship to a higher level than just being disinterested, self-absorbed citizens.... 
African Americans now proposed to more fully participate in civic affairs as part of their civic duty.”  
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rebound, the members of the Society had good reason to incur those costs – their reputations 
and private fortunes depended on it. 
The board of directors of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society was a small, 
homogeneous group of 21 members drawn from the local business, cultural, and religious 
community. The executive committee was even smaller, comprised of a subset of 10 
members. Every member of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society’s board of directors earned 
his livelihood directly from businesses in Chicago, and all of them were key figures in the 
major industrial, health, and religious life of pre-fire Chicago. Each had extensive experience 
and considerable specialized knowledge about operating large firms and social organizations 
within the community. Strong reputations and personal financial stakes in Chicago’s recovery 
from disaster gave the members of the Society meaningful responsibility over the relief 
effort. At the outset, members worried that “mid-winter might find us with our treasury 
bare...and with a city full of poor looking to us for food and fuel” (CRAS Circular, October 
24, 1871). Their collective deep interest in the community’s welfare created strong incentives 
for Society members to care about the outcome of their efforts. In comparison, “those who 
were regarded as the community’s authorities in the field of social welfare were content to 
hold themselves aloof and disclaim all responsibility, rather than to offer the leadership which 
might have led to improvement” (Brown 1941: 126). 
Practical knowledge of the transportation, housing, and shipping industries was of 
great importance, as was knowledge of local networks of physicians, community leaders, and 
aid societies. For example, T.M. Avery and T.W. Harvey were chairs of the Shelter and 
Housing Committee and both had extensive experience in the lumber industry. T.W. Harvey 
acquired his lumber company after buying out the interests of his partner in 1865, and, “until 
now[,] there are few if any more extensive lumber dealers in the world” (Andreas 1884a: 
373). After the fire, Harvey’s firm incorporated in Chicago, remaining profitable as Harvey 
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took positions in other local lumber companies. Both men had established knowledge of the 
lumber trade, were members of the Chicago Lumberman’s Exchange, possessed intricate 
knowledge of local supply routes, and had established relationships with vertically related 
shipping and receiving companies (Industrial Chicago 1894: 88). These men played vital 
roles in securing lumber for immediate construction of homes and buildings after the fire.  
Murry Nelson oversaw the distribution of donated goods, while Marshall Field sat on 
the governing board of that committee. Nelson had similar experience throughout the Civil 
War, coordinating the shipping and receiving of goods such as “vegetables, clothing and 
sanitary stores” (Andreas 1884a: 348). After the fire, Nelson relied on that experience to 
make decisions on the fly. For example, Nelson transformed a local skating rink into a frost-
proof building and divided cellars into space for storing perishable goods (Andreas 1884b: 
605). Marshall Field, on the other hand, was owner of the prominent dry goods retailer 
Marshall Field & Co., which burnt to the ground by the fire. Immediately afterward, Field 
resumed selling his goods from an old horse-railway barn spared by the fire (Andreas 1884a: 
695). He began rebuilding his business at the same time, both at the original retail location on 
the corner of State and Washington streets and a new wholesale house at Madison and 
Market streets. The wholesale operation opened first in March 1872; the retail location 
followed in 1873 (Andreas 1884a: 695).   
The leadership of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society had a history in the community, 
established experience with specific industries relevant to supplying relief, and a clear stake 
in Chicago’s commercial future. These features of the relief effort are consistent with the two 
theoretical hypotheses for effective bottom-up resource management and appear to have 
proven effective in Chicago.  
6.2 Hypothesis 2: the Chicago Relief and Aid Society’s constitutional rules 
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To ration relief aid, the Chicago Relief and Aid Society relied on an established 
organizational constitution specifying the conditions for disbursing aid. These rules clearly 
identified who had rights to withdraw resources from the common pool of aid funds and 
specified the criteria recipients had to meet to be eligible for receiving aid. Established 
bylaws spelled out the role of the executive committee and defined how decision-making 
authority worked within the organization. Thirteen constitutional rules outlined how the 
Society allocated, authorized, and accounted for the distribution of resources in the everyday 
course of operating its charitable function.  
The Chicago Relief and Aid Society’s constitution explicitly recognized the strategic 
dilemma of giving aid and adopted rules to mitigate moral hazard problems and limit 
potential free riders. Established in 1850, the rules of the Society reflect a decidedly 
individualist ideology (Sawislak 1995: 89). The first rule stipulated the scope of the 
organization’s aims, stating that  
The object of this Society is to aid such of the poor as through sickness or other 
misfortune require temporary assistance. The permanently dependent are not regarded 
as proper subjects, because if they should be relieved, the entire funds of the association 
would soon be exhausted in the support of a permanent list (Rule 1). 
Although the Society established a criterion for who were to be considered “deserving” poor, 
the constitution was general in that “each applicant for relief is regarded as entitled to charity 
until a careful examination proves the contrary” (Rule 2). Nonetheless, it imposed strict limits 
on general aid. Rule 5 insisted that relief “be discontinued to those who manifest a purpose to 
depend on alms rather than their own exertions for support”. These rules excluded “destitute 
persons sent from other cities” and “able-bodied men” (Rules 6 and 7). The former would be 
sent back to their previous residence and the latter “will be furnished employment directly by 
the Superintendent, or sent to reliable employment agents, which whom the Society 
cooperates”. Finally, the constitutional provisions stipulated that the Society would not 
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directly aid applicants making claims on other charities (Rule 8). All of these rules worked to 
identity who the Society would supply aid, in what forms and for what durations. In effect, 
these rules were explicitly concerned with avoiding the well-known moral hazard and free 
rider problems associated with administering aid.    
The Society’s rules for administering aid in normal circumstances were particularly 
well suited to the post-disaster context. The strong, pre-established principles for rationing 
aid provided a readily available, general framework for managing a crisis period when moral 
hazard and free-riding problems would be most severe. Without criteria for determining who 
should receive aid and in what manner, volunteers dispersing aid would face a greater 
likelihood of misallocating resources to people who had not been victimized and would have 
had no basis for prioritizing claims. The Society stipulated that persons seeking aid from 
outside the Chicago area be sent to their former residence because freely giving aid “would 
be offering a premium to other cities to send their poor to us to be supported” (CRAS 1874, 
Rule 6: 127). This constitutional rule served to mitigate free-rider problems and define the 
boundaries of aid. Similarly, the rules clearly stated that aid disbursements are “to be 
discontinued to those who manifest a purpose to depend on alms rather than their own 
exertions for support”, thereby limiting moral hazard in financing relief (CRAS 1874, Rule 5: 
127). Finally, to minimize duplication of services and deter free riders, the Society 
established a procedure whereby “applicants having claims on other charities are to be 
furnished with a card directing them to the same” (CRAS 1874, Rule 8: 127).   
In the post-disaster context, rules are necessary for establishing expectations about 
how relief organizations will allocate resources to victims. When the numbers of potential 
appropriators are substantial and the demand for common-pool resources strains available 
supplies, these pressures are likely to shorten potential beneficiaries’ time horizons. The 
catastrophic and unexpected nature of natural disasters means that people are more likely to 
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treat such situations as one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas wherein the dominant strategy for each 
player is to attempt to over-consume the available resources.   
Chicago Relief and Aid Society workers awarded aid to applicants based on how well 
they fit the pre-existing criteria in light of recommendations by the applicant’s peers and 
associates. The second and third rules in the constitution established a procedure whereby 
each applicant for relief was to be “regarded as entitled to charity until a careful examination 
proves the contrary” and that aid was to be accompanied by “a personal investigation of each 
case by visitation and inquiry (CRAS 1874, Rules 2 and 3: 127). The Society processed 
applications for housing and other aid by relying on members of the community familiar with 
the claimant. Letters from local merchants or the applicant’s co-religious adherents typically 
accompanied applications to validate claims. 
For example, Lawrence Saddler applied for materials to aid in the construction of a 
shelter home. His application included information about himself as a skilled tailor, head of a 
family of six, and owner of the land where he wanted to construct a temporary shelter while 
he arranged to rebuild a permanent home. Saddler was a successful applicant because letters 
from reputable associates within his community accompanied his request for aid. Local 
merchant T.F Phillips wrote to the Society that he had known the man for 15 years and that 
Saddler was “an honest, upright man and worthy of credit and confidence” (CRAS Saddler 
Correspondence 1872c). The Society also received a letter on Saddler’s behalf from his 
pastor, Reverend J. Cate, vouching for his losses in the fire and stating that “he greatly 
deserves to be helped in starting his business” (CRAS Saddler Correspondence 1872b).   
Kate Moran’s application for aid provides an example of how these mechanisms 
proved effective. Moran submitted her application accompanied by a letter of reference from 
a man named John Kennedy dated February 3rd, 1872 (CRAS Moran Correspondence 1872a 
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and 1872b). Kennedy’s letter gave “the widower Moran permission to build on my lot”, 
describing her as a “destitute and severe suffer by the late disastrous fire” (CRAS Moran 
Correspondence 1872b). By February 16th, the records contain a report submitted by a visitor 
on behalf of the Relief and Aid Society. The report charges that Moran lied on her 
application, did not disclose assets from a previous sale of property and current holdings, 
including a new milk cow, four adult children, and three tenants residing on her property.  
The agent stated that she could not recommend approval of Moran’s application for 
assistance (CRAS Moran Correspondence 1872c). In consequence, the Society rejected her 
application, terming the document “a perfect fraud” (CRAS Moran Correspondence 1872d).  
By establishing a mechanism for monitoring and enforcement that utilized a wide 
cross-section of the population, the Society could take advantage of third-party information to 
enforce its aid disbursements. This mechanism, while imperfect, provided a credible 
enforcement strategy. Robust bottom-up institutions require congruence between the rules 
governing the provision of the resources and the particulars of the local conditions (Ostrom 
1990). With claims to property and resources monitored by fellow community members, the 
process of dispersing aid was better able to reflect local knowledge and less subject to 
arbitrary decisions by decision makers far removed from the scene. 
7.  Conclusion 
Centralized administration of disaster relief is often thought of as the only set of institutional 
arrangements capable of coping successfully coping with the aftermaths of large-scale natural 
disasters. The Chicago Fire provides a case study of a successful, bottom-up relief effort led 
by a private organization. Monetary donations from thousands of sources outside of Chicago 
funded the relief effort, were quick to arrive, and were scaled back after the recovery was 
underway. The Chicago Relief and Aid Society coordinated the administration of aid along 
functionally specific margins guided by established rules.   
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 The implications of this case study are limited in important ways. The success of the 
Chicago relief effort does not imply that bottom-up solutions will always produce an 
effective arrangement for coping with large-scale disaster. The case study cannot answer the 
question of whether a centralized response would have done a better job at the time, or 
whether the voluntary sector could replicate this type of response today. The case also raises 
the question of why a federal system of disaster management would emerge on the heels of a 
decentralized jurisdictional landscape. Beito (2002) has argued that the rise of the US welfare 
state effectively crowded out private charitable organizations such as the Chicago Relief and 
Aid Society. While examining the case of the Chicago Fire cannot address that larger 
question, it can supply a deeper understanding of how bottom-up institutions worked prior to 
the emergence – and nearly complete dominance – of the modern centralized system. 
 The operations of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society demonstrate how the principles 
of effective self-governance worked in an unexpected, extremely pressurized social context 
for which there had been no precedent. The efforts of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society 
relied on constitutional rules governing aid, which worked effectively to mitigate moral 
hazard and free-rider problems. These particular normative rules governing the distribution of 
aid served a positive function in supplying effective criteria for managing a financial windfall 
springing from the very human impulse to aid the victims of a disaster beyond their control. 
By taking advantage of the moral sentiments and cooperative efforts of the Chicago 
community more broadly, the established Chicago Relief and Aid Society lowered the costs 
of supplying resources for the city’s relief and recovery by relying on local knowledge.   
Finally, municipal governments can contract – either vertically with state 
governments or horizontally with other jurisdictions (including private organizations, firms, 
and non-profits) – to supply relief goods. Centralized disaster response is more efficient than 
a decentralized response only when the costs of negotiating contracts to supply goods and 
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services demanded in the aftermath of disaster exceed the inefficiency costs of relying on 
centralized provision (Boettke et al. 2011). In the Chicago case, the costs of negotiating 
horizontally among jurisdictions did not impede disaster financing or limit the effective 
provision of disaster aid. Examining how multiple centers of independent authority operate to 
produce disaster relief provides new avenues of research for a contractual view of disaster 
response and assessing the comparative performance of centralized and bottom-up systems. 
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Appendix I: Constitutional Rules of the Chicago Relief and Aid 
Society  
Rule 1.  The object of this Society is to aid such of the poor as through sickness or other 
misfortune require temporary assistance.  The permanently dependent are not regarded as 
proper subjects, because if they should be relieved, the entire funds of the association would 
soon be exhausted in the support of a permanent list. 
Rule 2.  Each applicant for relief is regarded as entitled to charity until a careful examination 
proves the contrary. 
Rule 3.  Relief is only to be given after a personal investigation of each case by visitation and 
inquiry by the Superintendent or authorized visitor. 
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Rule 4.  Necessary articles in small quantities to be given, and only in proportion to 
immediate need. 
Rule 5.  Relief to be discontinued to those who manifest a purpose to depend on alms rather 
than their own exertions for support. 
Rule 6.  Destitute persona sent from other cities should be referred to the County Agent, to be 
sent to their former residence.  Should we undertake the support of such persons it would be 
offering a premium to other cities to send their poor to us to be supported. 
Rule 7.  Able-bodied men are not regarded as proper subjects for relief, but will be furnished 
employment directly by the Superintendent, or sent to reliable employment agents, which 
whom the Society cooperates. 
Rule 8.  Applicants having claims on other charities are to furnished with a card directing 
them to the same. 
Rule 9.  It is an absolute condition of relief by this Society that all persons receiving aid are 
not to ask alms or assistance of the pubic, either on the street, at residences, or places of 
business. 
Rule 10.  No loans shall be made from the funds of the Society. 
Rule 11.  As a rule, relief to be administered in supplies rather than money. 
Rule 12.  Subscribers to the funds of the Society are entitled to send persons applying to them 
for relief to the rooms of the Society, and will be furnished with cards for that purpose. 
Rule 13.  In all cases where families or personal have been aided by this Society through a 
winter, on account of want of employment, and are by us offered situation either in the city or 
country, adapted to their condition in life, with aid to reach such situations, which they refuse 
to accept, no further relief shall be extended to them.   
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Tables and Figures  
 
TABLE 1: TOTAL DONATIONS TO GENERAL RELIEF EFFORT BY MONTH, 1871-1873 
  
Donations 1871 1872 1873 
January 
 
$248,786 $5 
February 
 
$407,764 $11 
March 
 
$516,040 $82,776 
April 
 
$4,557 $910 
May 
 
$60,006   
June 
 
$11,558   
July 
 
$199,049   
August 
 
-   
September 
 
$9   
October $1,406,575 $687   
November $664,851 $267   
December $181,796 $950   
Total, Domestic  $2,253,224 $1,449,675 $83,703 
Total, Foreign  $1,024,403     
Total Donations $3,277,627 $1,449,675 $83,703 
Source: Author’s tabulations from Chicago Relief and Aid Society Annual Reports 1871-1873 
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FIGURE 1: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DOMESTIC DONATIONS TO CHICAGO, OCTOBER 14TH – 31TH 
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TABLE 2: SOURCE OF DOMESTIC DONATIONS 1871-1873  BY DONOR TYPE  
  
Donor Type Donation 
  Municipal  Governments $1,363,299 
  Business $1,311,742 
  Individuals $725,830 
  General State Funds $263,197 
  Clubs and Mutual Aid Societies $97,271 
  Churches and Religious Groups $23,761 
  Schools $3,312 
  Miscellaneous $187 
  Total Public  $1,626,497 
  Total Private $2,161,917 
  
Total Domestic Donations $3,788,603 
  Source: Author’s tabulations from Chicago Relief and Aid Society Annual Reports 1871-1873 
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 FIGURE 2: FAMILIES AIDED BY THE CHICAGO RELIEF AND AID SOCIETY, 1868 – 
1884
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TABLE 3: DEMOGRAPHICS OF AID     
Population by Birth 
1870 
Total Families 
Aided 
As a Percentage of 
Total Population of 
Cook County 
As a 
Percentage of 
Total Aid 
German 14,816 18% 38% 
Irish 11,623 12% 30% 
American 4,823 52% 12% 
Scandinavian 3,624 4% 9% 
English 1,406 3% 4% 
Negro 600 1% 2% 
Bohemian 565 2% 1% 
Scotch 526 1% 1% 
Source: Andreas (1884b: 613) 
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